Power, Sanctions, Politics of Interdependence as Policy Instruments and the EU

Abstract

The advancement of the global order has called into question the traditional beliefs regarding the mutually beneficial character of economic interdependence. This paper explores the way the European Union (EU), which has traditionally been viewed as a normative and regulatory institution, has been increasingly adopting coercive economic policies using interdependence. Based on the theoretical framework by Farrell and Newman, it examines the use of the central position in global financial and trade networks to leverage geopolitical influence by the EU. It is attempted to answer, how has the European Union employed economic interdependence as a form of statecraft to achieve its foreign policy objectives? and what are the mechanisms, scope, and implications of this strategy with the focus on EU’s sanctions against Russia, which took place after the Russia-Ukraine stand-off since after 2014.

The results imply that the EU application of financial sanctions, trade restrictions, and energy decoupling is a significant change of normative power to geo-economic statecraft. Although the measures have strengthened the EU as a geopolitical player, they have also helped to divide globalization, create rival economic blocs, and have led to the rise of a mistrust in Western-led institutions, especially among the Global South countries such as Pakistan. The interdependence is effective in the short run. However, objectives using this policy are achievable but at the cost of longterm stability and legitimacy of the liberal international order because it encourages the creation of alternative systems and diminishes systemic interdependence. Placing the developing strategy of the EU into the wider discussions on International Relations, this qualitative study helps to comprehend how the economic power is being re-positioned in the context of geopolitical rivalry, strategic independence, and global disunity.