WESTERN STATE FORMATION AND ALTERNATE STATE FORMATION: A COMPARATIVE CRITICAL APPRAISAL

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Introduction

The Westphalian state system, premised on the existence of territorially defined nation states, enjoying monopoly of violence over people and institutions within their boundaries, is a relatively recent phenomenon. Its emergence can be formally traced to the rise of the modern state system in 16th century Europe. The modern state system's formal emergence in Europe came with the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, which ended the Thirty Years war and also the Medieval system of feudalism[1] in the continent. It was the harbinger of the rise of sovereign and independent states with defined territories in Europe. The Treaty of Westphalia sanctioned Europe's division into territorially organized states, by recognizing the principle of state sovereignty and of non-interference in the territorial space of other states.[2]

The spread of the idea of the modern state system to other parts of the world began with the rise of European colonialism; however, modern statehood for a large number of Asian and African countries came only after the end of the Second World War. The process of decolonization was preceded by the struggle for self determination and independence by the people under the servitude of the European colonial powers, who after the Great War, were no longer in a position to retain their dominions. The unraveling of the European empires was followed by the addition of several new states in the international state system. Devoid of many attributes of statehood which their former European masters possessed, these new

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[1] The Medieval period in Europe is synonymous with the rise of feudalism, which began in the 9th century and continued for another six centuries.

[2] The treaty was signed between Catholic and Protestant rulers in Europe at the end of the Thirty Years War and is hailed as the first great international charter that provided mechanisms for peaceful settlement of disputes and facilitated Europe's reconstruction by restoring commerce and trade among the signatories. See Leo Gross, "The Peace of Westphalia 1648-1948," *The American Journal of International Law* 42, no.1 (January 1948): 20-41.

states were guaranteed juridical independence by various international treaties and through membership of international organizations, such as the United Nations. The post-war bi-polar world order provided artificial stability to the new states, which had access to economic and military aid from the two rival superpowers. It enabled the newly independent states to temporarily overcome many of their vulnerabilities. This artificial stability waned with the end of the Cold War, when aid cuts weakened the powers of patronage of the Third World regimes, allowing rebel groups to challenge the state. Civil wars, violence, population displacement, erosion of authority and malfunctioning of state institutions afflicted many developing states after the end of the Cold War, earning them the title 'failed states'.

This paper investigates state formation in Europe within the state building paradigms of coercion, capital and political legitimacy. It applies the same paradigm in exploring state building in non-Western societies. This comparative analysis aims to explore why the state making trajectory progressed differently in the non-Western societies and what lessons can be gleaned from the Western, particularly European state building experiences, which could be transmitted to the states born in the post 1945 period. The paper includes an introduction, followed by an analysis of the role of coercion, capital, and legitimacy in state making in Europe and in other societies. It then addresses the question of transferability of Western state building methods to the developing countries, and the last section provides the conclusions.

Coercion, capital, legitimacy and state making in Europe
Historically, prior to the emergence of modern states, politically organized communities, arose in various civilizations of Europe, the Middle East, South America, Africa and Asia. These political communities can be broadly classified as: tribes without rulers, tribes with rulers, city-states and empires. The first two types of segmentary or acephalous groups/tribes with and without rulers, were family, lineage or clan based, and regulated their affairs under unwritten rules that were partly religious and partly magic by origin.[3] City-states (Greek) and empires (Roman) among the pre-

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[3] These nomadic or semi nomadic tribes' livelihood depended on hunting, cattle raising, fishing and agriculture practiced at the subsistence level. For a discussion on pre-state political formations of tribe with and without rulers, see Martin Van Creveld, *The Rise and Decline of the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 2-25.

modern political entities came close to being a state. Whereas, the city-states were organized as small and basic political units in Greek cities,[4] where the state and society were hardly distinguishable, empires, on the other hand, encompassed vast territories and clearly distinguished the state from the individual that it represented. Such a distinction between the state and the society together with the grant of citizenship rights to all inhabitants of the empire as well as subjecting them to a systemized code (the Roman Law) are seen as the Roman empire's important contributions to the concept of a modern state.[5] Roughly by the 9th century, the Roman empire's decline ushered in the era of feudalism in Europe. There was no strong centralized rule and myriads of small, independent principalities appeared all over Europe, ruled by counts, lords and dukes (members of European aristocracy). Decentralized administration was amongst feudalism's prominent features. The decentralized form of political authority under feudalism suffered from some inherent contradictions which ultimately led to its downfall and the birth of large, territorially defined sovereign European states between 1450 and 1650.

In feudalism, government survived largely owing to a system of cooperation between various counts, lords and dukes, who otherwise ran independent estates that preserved law and order and also had self perpetuating mechanisms. In the feudal system, with its decentralized, contractual nature, hundreds of small territories, cities, principalities, and estates functioned in relative independence and with little direction from a higher political authority.[6] A lord-vassal system prevailed, wherein the Lord (king) loosely exercised some control over the vassals or the dukes. These vassals were indispensable to the Lord because they possessed large tracts of lands, provided soldiers for waging wars, dispensed justice, filled the Lord's coffers by collecting taxes and gave counsel to him. The bottom rung of this system was held by the serfs and peasants, who either tilled their own land or that of their masters, shared the yield with their dukes, and also served as soldiers during wars.[7] The King's sovereignty had another

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[4] On political organization of the City-States, see Earnest Barker, *Greek Political Theory: Plato and his Predecessors* (Great Britain: Mathuen & Co Ltd., 1918), 19-46.

[5] For Roman political thought, see Lawrence C. Wanlass, *Gestell's History of Political Thought* (Delhi: Surjeet Publications, 1956), 75-80.

[6] For politico-military features of feudalism, See Walter C. Opello and Stephen J. Rosow, *The Nation-State and Global Order: A Historical Introduction to Contemporary Politics* (New Delhi: Viva Books Private Limited, 2005), 37-52.

[7] Ibid.

challenger – the Church, which claimed absolute authority over spiritual matters and even a strong say in temporal ones. Such fragmentation of power encouraged strife, for the Higher Lord's monopoly over power was also contested and challenged by the assemblies comprising representatives of the higher clergy and the nobility, without whose consent and cooperation the Lord could not levy taxes or raise an army.

In the early feudal era, the King's weak authority was also owing to the indecisive nature of wars, which could be attributed to the low level of military technology. This deficiency was removed by the development of the technology of warfare, for instance with the invention of the longbow, pikes and gunpowder. The invention of gunpowder drastically changed the pattern of warfare. The events between 1300-1600 underlined the need for trained and equipped militaries.[8] Improvements in military technology and the decisive outcome of wars provided the monarch with the motivation to acquire military resources independent of the nobles. The rise in military expenditure was met by direct and indirect taxes, deficit financing and accelerated efforts at the coercive collection of taxes.[9] Such taxation served as the 'sinews of war' and acted as a catalyst for the emergence of fiscal administration and centralized bureaucracy in Europe. Besides strengthening the monarch's politico-military position vis-à-vis other contenders, it enabled him to expand the incipient state's functions to include trade regulation, road building and the creation of security structures.[10]

Wars and the imposition of taxes for financing them, made state building in Europe a wholly coercive and intimidating process. State building costs were high and involved long and bloody wars with rival nobles, the Church and the ordinary people who were often forced to surrender material

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[8] Europe is credited with the rise of modern armed forces and weaponry. For details of development of military technology and the invention of armies from the Neolithic era to the modern period (early 20th century). See Barton C. Hacker, "Military Technology and World History: A Reconnaissance," *The History Teacher* 30, no.4 (August 1997): 461-487.

[9] The growth of government expenditure on military and corresponding state revenues is discussed in Richard Bean, "War and the Birth of the Nation State," *The Journal of Economic History* 33, no.1(March 1973): 203-221; and Opello and Rosow, *The Nation-State,* 55-64.

[10] See Charles Tilly, "Sinews of War", Center for Research on Social Organization, Working Paper no. 195 (March 1975).

possessions.[11] The intense character of state building has thus been termed an 'organized crime', wherein, war making, state making, protection, extraction and violence were all involved in producing in the long run, various forms of organization, including army, navy, bureaucracy, judicial system and fiscal and accounting structures.[12] As pointed out by Tilly, war made the state and state made war[13] Violent, at times long-drawn and widespread wars, established state boundaries, defined territories and reduced the number of independent states in Europe[14] from 200 in 1648 to 25 in 1900.[15] The connection between wars and state expansion continued into the 20th century as global wars and their aftermath expanded the scope of the state's functions, which now included expenditure on welfare services.[16]

On the capital side, expansion of the tax base was aided by the growth of mercantile activity, trade and manufacturing, and the capitalist mode of production in Europe.[17] The monarch raised capital by expanding the tax base and increasing the productive capacity of the economy. The capitalist mode of production saw a phenomenal growth and this acted as a concomitant to the rise of modern bureaucratic states. The initial mode of tax collection from commercial, trade and productive activities was very coercive in nature. This coercive form of taxation become consensual with time, when "mobile capital or footloose traders", forced European rulers to treat them on concessional terms, by threatening them with relocation of

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[11] For a historical account of the struggle between monarchs, church, nobility and towns in Europe, see Martin Van Creveld, *The Rise and Decline of the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press*,* 1999), 55-125

[12] See Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," Peter Evans (ed.), *From Bringing the State Back* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 181-184.

[13] But European rulers did not engage consciously in building states; it grew out of their efforts at raising strong armies for defeating internal and external enemies. See Tilly, ibid.

[14] 119 wars were fought in Europe between 1648 and 1945. See K. J. Holsti, "War, Peace and the State of the State," *International Political Science Review* 16, no. 4 (October 1995): 322.

[15] See Lisa Anderson, "Antiquated Before they can Ossify: States that Fail Before they Form," *Journal of International Affairs* 58, no. 1(Fall 2004): 6.

[16] See Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson, "War Making and State Making: Governmental Expenditures, Tax Revenues, and Global Wars," *The American Political Science Review* 79, no. 2 (June 1985): 491-507.

[17] There was a marked increase in central revenues and per capita income, rising by 200 % for England and France and 1000% for Spain. See Bruce D. Porter, *War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 34.

trade to other cities. Such moves would have deprived governments of income sources. The consensual form of taxation with time, resulted in the ruler sharing authority with the representatives of the tax payers.[18] Henceforth, official taxation was progressively legitimized by diverting public resources from patrimonial to bureaucratic and public expenditures, reflecting the rise of nationalistic consciousness.[19] However, this diversion of resources from patrimonial to bureaucratic and public expenditure, came much later. Some historians also argue that the stability of the tax structure depended on the provision of justice to the people, but emphasize that war expenses in medieval Europe were primarily met through borrowing, sale of assets, currency debasement and temporary increases in the rates of existing taxes.[20]

Tilly, adds two more factors to the rise of modern statehood. First, Europe's cultural homogeneity, which assisted the state's expansion into new territories by easing the diffusion of organizational models and helped in the movement of population and administrative personnel from one government to another.[21] Second, Europe's open geographical peripheries in terms of lack of power concentration around areas where states were forming, which made territories available for a state's geographical expansion and resource extraction.[22] Europe's cultural homogeneity and geographical expanse notwithstanding, the 'war making states' argument is criticized by some scholars as being over simplistic. Gladstone, for example, criticizes this approach for negating, or at least ignoring the role of

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[18] England is credited with being the first fiscal state to emerge in 17th century Europe. See Mick Moore, "State Formation and Quality of Governance in Developing Countries," *International Political Science Review* 25, no. 3 (July 2004): 298-230.

[19] See Pierre Bourdieu, Loic J. D. Wacquant and Samar Farage, "Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field," *Sociological Theory* 12, no. 1 (March 1994): 3-10.

[20] Ames and Rapp argue on long wars necessitating imposition of new and permanent taxes. See Edward Ames and Richard T. Rapp, "The Birth and Death of Taxes: A Hypothesis," *The Journal of Economic History* 37, no. 1 (March 1977): 161-178.

[21] Western and Central Europe's cultural, social and to lesser extent economic homogeneity (prior to 1500), continued even in the wake of the destruction of the Catholic Church's unity by the rise of Protestantism. See Thomas Ertman, *Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 5.

[22] See Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," in Charles Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 17-21.

ideology, revolutions, religious conflicts and conflicts between landlords and non-landlords in the making of the state system in Europe.[23] A similar form of criticism is also raised by Mc. Neill, who is sceptical of this theory for ignoring the role of political legitimacy, the clergy, Europe's demography and the impact of technological changes on state formation processes in Europe.[24]

Despite common features, state making in Europe followed different trajectories which resulted in a variety of state systems. Constitutional governments evolved in England, Hungary, Poland and Sweden, while autocratic governments flourished in France, Spain, Portugal, Savoy, Naples, Denmark, and the German principalities. This variation is attributed by scholars to differences in geography, economic structures, nature of representative assemblies and level of knowledge of administrative and financial matters. Hintze, extols geography in the context of European states facing a greater threat of land warfare, to have developed autocratic systems.[25] This contention is challenged for its failure to explain the rise of constitutional regimes in Hungary and Poland, despite sustained (land) military pressures from the Turks and the Russians.[26] Tilly asserts that states which depended on the supply of resource through the sea (sea faring states), such as England, the Netherlands and Venice, developed slimmer and constitutional governments, with lesser capacity to deal with local rivals. On the other hand, states with large populations and territory (land ones), such as France and Russia, developed bulky bureaucracies and a feudal system for extracting resources from rebellious populations.[27] This explanation has been termed as insufficient by Ertman, who argues that the sea faring states as compared to the land ones faced much greater problems in collecting commercial taxes, which required of them to

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[23] See Jack A. Goldstone, "States Making States Making Wars Making States", *Contemporary Sociology* 20, no. 2 (March 1991): 176-178.

[24] By stressing on the dependence of the majority of medieval European states on land resources, he disregards differences in levels of agricultural growth, techniques of cultivation, and property laws in the processes of state making. See William H. McNeill, Book Review of *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990* by Charles Tilly," in *The Journal of Modern History* 64, no. 3 (September 1992): 583-584.

[25] Hintze, as cited in Ertman, *Birth of the Leviathan*, 15-20.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Tilly, quoted in Achim Wennman, "Grasping the Strength of Fragile States: Aid Effectiveness Between Top-down and Bottom up State Building", *CCDP Working Paper* (Geneva, 2010): 14-15.

possess specialized knowledge and training, and therefore it is these states which should have acquired despotic governments instead of the land ones.[28]

Attributing variations in the state system to the nature of the growth of representative assemblies in Europe, Ertman, correlates England's constitutionalism to its parliament's multi-class character, where the nobility and the rural based local assembly's representatives jointly resisted royal absolutism. Ertman argues that German territories and Latin Europe developed into absolutist states, because their multi-layered, estate based separate assemblies of clergy, nobles and burghers could not make a common cause to resist the monarch. He further attributes patrimonial practices to early or late growth of administrative and financial services. In states that modernized under military pressures prior to 1450, rulers were forced to concede substantial direct control over emerging state apparatuses to patrimonial groups. Learning from the mistakes of the pioneers in state building, the late starters avoided these mistakes and resisted large scale appropriation of power by office holders and financiers.[29]

What the above discussion suggests is that multiple variations of state systems appeared in Europe at different stages of state evolution. These variations in state systems sprang not only from the distinct levels in the growth of political and administrative structures, but also resulted from differences in economic structures, geo-political environment and the timing of adoption and diffusion of bureaucratized, centralized administrations. Though the growth of coercive state apparatus and that of capital went hand in hand, the concept that state authority should draw legitimacy from the consent of the people came much later, in the 19th and 20th centuries. A homogeneous population that could relate its identity to the territory in a nation state, emerged only after the consolidation of the state's monopoly over the coercive apparatus and extension of its authority to the periphery. As suggested by de Walle and Scott, nationalism developed with the state's penetration, standardization and

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[28] See Ertman, *Birth of the Leviathan*, 25-30.

[29] Among the late state builders, he gives examples of Germany, Northern Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Hungary and Poland, which modernized after 1500. They established modern bureaucracies, based upon separation of office from the person of the office holder. See Ertman, ibid, 30-34.

accommodation of the population in a process, where public services and infrastructure were made accessible to the common man to engender a sense of loyalty among the people to the centre.[30]

The above section argued that the European state making experience was facilitated by the contradictions of medieval politics; particularly the contested nature of the sovereign's power. The development of military technology made wars decisive and underlined the significance of standing armies, maintained by the state. Coercion became a tool of state building for wars necessitated forced conscriptions and the imposition of taxes to support military growth. Its final effect was establishing the state's monopoly over violence within the territorial unit claimed by sovereign monarchs. The section also contends that the role of capital was crucial in building standing armies and constructing bureaucratic administrations. However, capital was generated from internal revenue sources. It also argues that in Europe, state building preceded nation building and the notion of legitimacy. Popular democratic legitimacy evolved at a much later stage, once centralization and coercive control over territory and population had already been accomplished.

Alternate state formation in non-Western societies
After a brief account of the emergence of the modern state in Europe, this section makes an attempt to answer the following questions: What parallels, if any can be drawn between the state making and state building processes in Europe and the rest of the world? Does "the war-making states" argument apply in the non European (and non-Western) context? How different was the state making experience in non-Western societies? And finally what lessons can be drawn from the European state making experience for the states that came into being after the Second World War ended?

The modern state system was transmitted to other parts of the world through the process of colonialism.[31] On the eve of colonization, Asia's and

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[30] Obligatory schooling and mass conscription introduced people to the norms and values of the state and physical networks and standardized services led to physical and psychological unification of the nation and the national territory. See Steven Van de Walle and Zoe Scott, "The Political Role of Service Delivery in State Building: Exploring the Relevance of European History for Developing Countries," *Development Policy Review* 29, no. 1 (2011): 5-21.

Africa's[32] small and large empires, emirates, and tribal chiefdoms were organized, either under centralized rule, or segmentary lineage systems. The domination of a great part of the world by some European states led to a widespread loss of sovereignty, obliteration of indigenous pre-colonial administrative structures and the transformation of the Asian and African political landscape, underpinned by arbitrary boundary demarcations. Hence, at the very outset, the European state making experience can be distinguished from the processes in other parts of the world on the basis of it having been by and large free of conquest and rule by colonial powers. The pre-colonial political systems in Africa and Asia underwent profound changes and in many instances destruction at the hands of European colonizers. In Libya, Lebanon, and North Yemen, the French and Italian colonial masters got rid of the Ottoman administrative and military structures, initiating, in Anderson's words, state-society relations based on kinship and tribal relations. Such re-ordering of socio-political relations attuned these patrimonial groups to persistently challenge the state's authority and legitimacy in the post-colonial period.[33]

The rise of European military and economic might and its manifestation in outward expansion to Asia had alarmed the 18th century Asian rulers, so that they began what can be called 'defensive modernization'. They undertook re-structuring of military, bureaucratic and tax administrations not under pressure of the internal political and economic dynamics, but as a defensive response to the expansion of European power. However, the process of 'defensive modernization' was interrupted by the domination of

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[31] Portugal, Britain and the Netherlands were the first among the nation states of Europe to emerge as global powers competing over colonial lands and resources. See Goerge Modelski, "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 20, no. 2 (April 1978): 214-235.

[32] Some scholars contend that the undeveloped and diffused nature of the political systems in Africa was an important reason why they were more easily conquered by European powers. See Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Sovereignty and Underdevelopment: Juridical Statehood in the African Crisis," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 24, no. 1 (March 1986): 7. This is disputed by Bruce who cites Ghana and Mali which were among the important ancient empires that flourished in Africa. See Nii Lante Wallace-Bruce, "Africa and International Law," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 23, no. 4 (December 1985): 575-602.

[33] In Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey, where continuity of growth in administrative capacity was ensured, stable attributes of statehood in the form of well established military, bureaucratic and revenue structures developed. See Lisa Anderson, "The State in the Middle East and North Africa," *Comparative Politics* 20, no. 1 (October 1987): 1-15.

the world by some European countries. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that the continents other than Europe, presented a much more complex picture in terms of extension and monopoly of power over a diverse and varied social and cultural landscape. For example, the Middle East's societal structure was based on agriculture and nomadic pastoralism, but there was a central administration under the Ottomans, which allowed considerable local autonomy. Extensive long distance trade and political and economic autonomy of the groups stand in sharp contrast to Europe's pre-modern society, characterized by its peasants' varied arrangements with lords and dukes and the absence of tribal or lineage based groups.[34]

In non-European societies, statehood came, not so much as a result of internal struggles and external wars, as in Europe, but from the imperial powers' inability to control and sustain such large territories after the traumatic experiences of the Second World War. The freedom movements in Asia after the Second World War were supported by the UN Security Council resolutions on the right of self determination.[35] This is not to suggest that the anti-imperialist movements of the Asian and African nationalists were entirely peaceful or non-violent. The history of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent's and other colonized states' nationalist movements suggests constant efforts by the colonial governments to quell what they saw as rebellion against imperial power. However, independence was achieved not as a result of internal struggles and external wars by indigenous elites, but when the metropolitan powers were themselves convinced of the futility of holding on to their foreign dominions. In case of the African continent, the African Group in the United Nations[36], which transformed into the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, played a crucial role in bringing the world body's attention to the questions of

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[34] Ibid.

[35] For example, the Security Council Resolution no. 1514 outlined the right of self determination of nations. The term "self determination" was first used by US President Woodrow Wilson in 1918, and it became part of the UN Charter (Article 1 and 55) in 1945. Later in 1960 it was included in the UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. In 1966 the right of nations to self determination was included in the UN Covenants on Human Rights. See Frederic L. Jr. Kirgis, "The Degrees of Self Determination in the United Nations Era," *The American Journal of International Law* 88, no. 2 (April 1994): 304-310.

[36] The African Group comprising 8 states (1958) used the platform of the UN for getting international support for African anti colonial movements. See Catherine Hoskyns, "The African States and the United Nations 1958-1964," *International Affairs* 40, no. 3 (July 1964): 466-480.

colonialism and self determination of the African peoples.[37] In the absence of viable economies and workable political systems, the grant of independence was criticized for creating economically dependent and politically volatile states.[38]

European and non-European states were created under totally different international environments. As opposed to European history where we find that weak states perished in the struggle for state formation, the contemporary international system to use Barkey and Parekh's words, is highly tolerant of and nourishes weak states.[39] This tolerance takes several forms. The principles of non intervention and peaceful settlement of disputes enshrined in the UN Charter, ensure respect for the territorial sovereignty of such states. Their existence is further strengthened by many global conventions that insist on territorial integrity and independence of states.[40] The doctrine of *uti possidetis*, for example, adopted by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the case Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali (1986) ensures the sanctity of colonial borders and frontiers.[41] These guarantees of the sanctity of state borders were largely absent when states were forming in Europe, where external pressures of the threat of war and conquest by an adversary acted as a stimulus for developing coercive apparatus and centralized cohesive states. In some non-European examples, such as those of Japan, China, Cuba, Taiwan, South Korea and Israel, external threats led to the consolidation of internal administration.

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[37] The number of independent states in Africa grew from 8 in 1958 to 34 in 1964. See Hoskyns, ibid, 479.

[38] The UN's hasty manner of extending support to Africans for their independence from colonial powers was criticized, partly because economic backwardness prevented them from paying even their dues to the UN. See Roy Welensky, "The United Nations and Colonialism in Africa", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *Africa in Motion* (July 1964), 354.

[39] See Karen Barkey and Sunita Parekh, "Comparative Perspectives on the State," *Annual Review of Sociology*, no. 17 (1991): 530-31.

[40] Regional organizations, such as OAU, for example have denied the right of self-determination to local secessionist groups by recognizing a government's authority to rule over the country, if it effectively controls the capital city. See Jeffrey Herbst, "The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa," *International Organization*, no. 43 (Autumn 1989): 673-692.

[41] This doctrine was supposed to minimize territorial disputes and maximize peace among post colonial states. See Michael Freeman, "National Self-Determination, Peace and Human Right," *Peace Review* 10, no. 2 (June 1998): 157-63; and Halim Moris, "Self-Determination: An Affirmative Right or Mere Rhetoric" (1997): 6, available from http://www.tamilnation.org/selfdetermination/97moris.htm.

However, for a majority of non-Western societies, it is not external threats but civil wars and internal strife which are weakening and destabilizing these states.[42] The ethnic, and religious composition of the post-1945 states has created situations where sections of population are violently challenging the legitimacy of not only the regimes but the very existence of the states.[43] Such civil strife has eroded states' legitimacy and weakened the effectiveness of their formal institutions.[44]

Some scholars disagree over the question whether 'war made the state' argument is applicable to non-Western societies. Cohen, et al. contrast peasant struggles in Java and India against agrarian taxes, to the European peasant resistance against the king's officials. They argue that such armed resistance is in retaliation against state expansion and, therefore violence in the new states, need not be interpreted as an indication of political decay but as a usual feature of the process of primitive accumulation of power.[45] Niemann, likewise, argues that the conflict in DR Congo for example, is one of state formation in a global age, characterized by a struggle for state control, the elimination of rival sources of violence and the protection of commercial clients. The protagonists (the DRC government, the rebel movement and the armed forces of neighbouring Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe), to him, are engaged in war making, state making, protection and extraction, either directly or through proxies, with the objective of selling mineral resources in the global market and thereby accumulating profits.[46] While war and violence in Europe made the state and   enabled the sovereigns to define state boundaries through

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[42] Out of 187 wars in the period, 1945-1995, two-thirds were intra-state, mainly in Africa, the Middle East, South and South East Asia. See Holsti, "War, Peace," 322.

[43] Christopher Clapham, "The Challenge to the State in a Globalized World," *Development and Change* 33, no. 5 (2002): 786.

[44] Taylor and Botea contend that internal wars can strengthen states only when backed by a core ethnic group and a powerful ideology, as in Vietnam (1946-1989), but in the absence of political and national coherence, such wars greatly weaken the state, as in Afghanistan (1978-2008). See Brian D. Taylor and Roxana Botea, "Tilly Tally: War-Making and State-Making in the Contemporary World," *International Studies Review*, no. 10 (2008): 27-56.

[45] See, Youssef Cohen, Brian R. Brown, and A. F. K. Organski, "Paradoxical Nature of State Making: The Violent Creation of Order," *The American Political Science Review* 75, no. 4 (December 1981): 901-910.

[46] He finds the process different in terms of involvement of globalized transaction of money and weapons, which prolongs conflicts and regional and international efforts to negotiate end of conflict. See Michael Niemann, "War Making and State Making in Central Africa," *Africa Today* 53, no. 3, (Spring 2007): 22-36.

centralization and monopolization, it is highly unlikely that states in non-Western societies would be able to avoid violent struggles in the process of state centralization and expansion. But unlike the fluid state boundaries in Europe, the new states inherited boundaries as a given reality, which at times make wars assume the characteristic of an internal struggle between the state's security establishment and rebel groups, fighting to gain political leverage for control over state resources. These wars are financially aided by the globalized exchange of arms and money, minerals and drug trade across states' borders. Civil wars in Africa are conspicuously funded from trade in illegal and contraband items, which prolong the duration of such conflicts and involve neighbouring states, who fight as proxies, supply men and material and provide sanctuaries to rebels in border areas. And, the multifarious effects of these conflicts in the form of spread of militancy, radical ideologies, diseases, displaced populations and economic problems are borne by neighbouring states.

Regarding the role of capital in state making, the European trajectory of state formation has some parallels with India, where the extraction of resources for building centralized military organizations began in the late medieval period.[47] Moore, has investigated the central role of elites in administering high levels of extraction in India and the early development of administrative apparatus, which got hold of a third of agricultural produce through land tax.[48] The British, largely built upon the administrative and financial system of the Mughals. In the majority of the new states born in the post 1945 period, revenues are generated from external sources like petroleum rents, foreign aid, and borrowing from abroad. This is in stark contrast to Europe, where development of the state was financed by domestic extraction of resources in the form of taxation on

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[47] Modernization of the army and military fiscalism was initiated in South India during the time of Tipu Sultan, who coercively contested the contending claims of sovereignty by the rajas and created a centralized revenue administration, which replaced the tribute system by revenue collection through Amildars (non-local state officials). These policies were continued by the British East India Company after the takeover of Mysore in 1799. For details see Burton Stein, "State Formation and Economy Reconsidered: Part One," *Modern Asian Studies* 19, no. 3 (1985): 387-413.

[48] He attributes India's democratic stability and authoritative government to its history of strong administrative rule, with clear parallels to Europe's trajectory of state development. See Mick Moore, "State Formation, and Quality of Governance in Developing Countries," *International Political Science Review/ Revue international de science politque* 2, no. 3 (July 2004): 316.

trade, commerce, mercantile activity and expanded base of production. The non extraction of income from domestic resources frees a government from popular demands for representation and welfare, undermines its legitimacy, weakens the inducement to develop administrative capacity and encourages authoritarianism.[49] This also sets in motion in the words of Leander, "decentralization of state's control over capital and coercion". He attributes such decentralization to the international guarantee of the inviolability of borders and the sanctity of the principle of state sovereignty. The loose hold over instruments of coercion of Third World regimes provides local strongmen opportunities to sponsor security through militias, maintained in turn through illegal income generation activities. And decentralization of capital inflows is taking place because there is more borrowing of capital from abroad, rather than its extraction from domestic resources.[50] This is reflective of a reverse causality mechanism in the growth of capital and coercion in European and other societies. Unlike, Europe, where state builders extracted resources internally to confront external security challenges, in non-European societies, rulers acquire resources from external sources to confront internal wars or strife.[51]

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[49] For an analysis of how rentier income destabilizes Third World regimes, see Moore, "State Formation and Quality of Governance in Developing Countries," 304-308; Benjamin Smith, "Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960-1999," *American Journal of Political Science* 48, no. 2 (April 2004): 234-36; Jonathan di John, 'Oil Abundance and Violent Political Conflict: A Critical Assessment." *Journal of Development Studies* 43, no. 6 (2007): 973; Leonard Wantchekon, "Why do Revenue Abundant Countries have Authoritarian Governments?" (October 15, 2002), available from http://www.afea-jad.com/2002/wantchekon3.pdf; and Dwayne Woods, "Predatory Elites, Rents and Cocoa: A Comparative Analysis of Ghana and Ivory Coast," *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 42, no. 2 (July 2002): 224-39

[50] See Anna Leander, "Wars and the Un-Making of States: Taking Tilly Seriously in the Contemporary World", in Stefano Guzzini and Dietrich Jung (eds.), *Conceptual Innovations and Contemporary Security Analysis* (London: Routledge, 2001), 69-80.

[51] The altered nature of threat and changes in revenue sources modifies the relationship between war and state creation, radically transforming the nature of warfare itself. See Daniel Biro. "The (Un) bearable Lightness of…Violence: Warlordism as an Alternate Forms of Governance in the Westphalian Periphery?" In Tobias Debiel and Daniel Lambach (eds.), *State Failure Revisited II: Actors of Violence and Alternate Forms of Governance* (Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg-Essan, INEF Report, 89, 2007), 21-22, accessed on December 9, 2011 from http://inef.uni-due.de/page/documents/Report89.pdf.

A further difference with regard to capital and state making can be gleaned in the far wider range of economic activities which states in alternate societies have begun to indulge in. In Europe, the scope of state functions widened with the expansion in tax base for financing new and prolonged wars, which resulted in the formation of highly centralized and bureaucratized states. This happened in the beginning of 20th century, when wars resulted in the creation of 'maximal states' that were supposed to go beyond the traditional functions of defence and maintenance of internal order to that of 'adjudication, redistribution and extensive infrastructural development'.[52] The rise of the concept of welfare state increased state responsibilities in democratic and totalitarian states, and the independence of the colonies saw the scope of state functions widen even further. In these states, low levels of industrial and economic growth made the governments adopt centralized planning for growth and development, including infrastructure provision, direct investment in and management of public enterprises and subsidizing of growth in industry and export.[53] The difference here is obvious; while the European states assumed additional economic responsibilities after the initial process of state formation was almost complete, the states in the Third World assumed extraordinary tasks in relation to their economies immediately after independence. This was not only owing to structural economic deficiencies, but also because the conventional development theories, recommended that the post-colonial states have an intrusive control over their economies.[54]

As for the growth of nationalism, both European and non European state builders had to deal with challenges with regard to the integration of the state's and the people's identity to create a legitimacy base for their political rule. Territorial, ethnic, linguistic and cultural homogeneity developed in Europe between the late 19th and the early 20th centuries. In the past, legitimacy either had a civil or a historic base, with the state moulding a territorial nation, or a natural one, where the nation helped

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[52] See Michael C. Desch, "War and Strong States. Peace and Weak States?" *International Organizations* 50, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 241.

[53] For the state's role in economic development, see James A. Caporaso, "The State's Role in Third World Economic Growth", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 459 (January 1982): 103-111.

[54] These theories included, for example, the Structural Theories of 1940s, and the Western European theories of development, including the Linear Stages of Growth philosophy.

create the state.[55] For states coming into existence after 1945, national cohesion became elusive owing to social, cultural and religious heterogeneity, made worse by the colonial demarcation of boundaries that either lumped together many groups in single administrative units or divided single groups into separate units. The elites of the developing countries undertook state building alongside nation building and both these processes often failed to complement each other. The post 1945 democratic norms of elections through universal adult franchise, representative government, constitutional guarantees of civil liberties and a vibrant civil society complicated the state building tasks for these elites. The post-1945 world defined legitimacy as the embracing of all these democratic ideals. Devoid of the political, economic and social pre-requisites for democracy, non-Western societies witnessed a transition from colonial to quasi-democratic and finally military governments. Thus with very few exceptions, democratic governments in the new states of Asia and Africa were often dislodged through military takeover.

The findings of this section suggest that unlike Europe, the state in non-Western societies grew out of the collapse of colonialism. The growth of coercion followed a path distinct from Europe and the state's monopoly over violence was never complete especially in its periphery, owing to multiple problems that were a product of centuries of colonial rule. The borders of these states were sanctified by international law and the norms of sovereignty. Wars assumed an internal character, weakening the state's cohesiveness. Capital was derived from outside sources, rather than being indigenously derived. The processes which underpinned state making in the West had few parallels in non Western societies.

Lessons for the new post-1945 states?

The above discussion leads us to the conclusion that the processes which lie at the heart of the Western European state making experience have few parallels in the non-Western societies. State building through centralization, taxation inducing bureaucratic and administrative development, and the development of civic and representative political institutions through bargaining between the rulers and the ruled are processes that have seldom been the driving force behind state building in non-Western settings. Why study state building in Europe when there are

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[55] See Holsti, "War, Peace," 325-327.

few parallels to draw for understanding alternate state formation? And can some lessons be deduced for transferability to non Western settings?

The European state making experience helps us to understand more clearly the process of state formation in the new states of Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe. It contributes to an understanding of the constraints under which alternate state formation took place and how these constraints created a crisis of legitimacy and governance for the developing countries' elites. The European experience teaches us that a very important requirement for successful state building is creating apolitical bureaucratic structures (civil service, judiciary, police and army) for achieving the twin objectives of maintaining order and providing services to the population. It also demonstrates that state making is a long term, non-linear, difficult and laborious task. Therefore, while criticizing the developing world elite for their timorous attempts at building strong and centralized monopoly of power, we need to acknowledge that the state building task is further complicated by new constraints and compulsions. For example, globalization and its concomitant adverse effects on state cohesion and strength were not present when states were forming in the early modern period in Europe.

Globalization is blamed for increasing the security predicaments for the developing world by forcing states to address a broad range of environmental, economic, socio-political and security concerns that are largely beyond the control and capacity of governments. When a state's infrastructure is unable to deal with crises effectively, it weakens and collapses. Also, the state's ability to direct and commandeer resources and its political centrality as the generator of security and welfare is compromised owing to the shifting of transnational activity from state to supra and sub state levels. [56] An example is the link between the world market and regional war economies (drugs, arms, oil and diamonds).[57] In

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[56] Axtmann, terms this process "denationalization of the state" or 'destatization' of the political system; here the state either entirely transfers public responsibilities or exercises these in partnership with para-statal, NGOs. See Roland Axtmann, "The State of the State: The Model of the Modern State and its Contemporary Transformation," *International Political Science Review* 25, no. 3 (July 2004), 268-71.

[57] This has led to what some refer to as state system breakdown due to the emergence from within states of regions and forces linked to the global economy independently of the state. See "Failed and Collapsed States in the International System," The African Studies Centre, Leiden, The Transnational Institute, Amsterdam, The Center of Social Studies,

the economic realm, globalization is credited with increasing the state's current account deficit by increasing the volume of imports. It makes developing states vulnerable to changes in the monetary policies of the developed world, for example, higher interest rates in the developed world discourages the outflow of capital to the developing countries. It is also said to curb revenue generation for fiscal authorities, by causing flight of capital to countries with lower taxes, which puts pressures on the currency and weakens the banking system.[58] Global trading markets enable insurgents to use profits from smuggled commodities for financing protracted civil wars. Prolonged conflict, in turn, has the potential to challenge regional and global security, because of the growing interdependence of states.[59] The weakness of a state's coercive capacity encourages non-state actors to defy its sovereignty and abrade its authority. Such non-state actors have the potential to challenge the integrity of states and weaken their coercive abilities.[60] Influences of this sort were not there to hinder the early state builders' attempts at state formation in Europe.

Another lesson that can be drawn from the successful European state making experience is that long run stability and order requires state structures to be built around non-patrimonial, efficient and patronage free institutions and practices. European state making has had a fair share of inefficient and patrimonial regimes that nonetheless proved extremely durable and hard to remove. Ertman, gives the example of the French monarchy (the Bourban dynasty to be exact) that lasted for around 300 years despite massive inefficiency and corruption[61]. It took centuries for

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Coimbra University, and The Peace Research Center- CIP-FUHEM, Madrid (December 2003), 1-24.

[58] United Nations, "Annual Review of Developments in Globalization and Regional Integration in the Arab Countries, 2008", Summary, 1 at www.escwa.org.

[59] Alexandros Yannis, "State Collapse and its implications for Peace-Building and Reconstruction," *Development and Change* 33, no. 5 (2002): 817-835.

[60] The Pakistani government's 2009 operation against the Taliban in Swat valley of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, put tremendous financial strain on the state, generated a massive refugee crisis (more than 3 million displaced from their homes) and adversely affected the economy of the area, affecting tax returns to the state.

[61] Even in England, which rose as the first tax state of Europe, patrimonial practices in the form of proprietary office holding, tax farming, and inside finance with their accompanying inefficiency, arbitrariness, and diversion of substantial public revenues into private hands, was pervasive during the initial phases of state building. See Ertman, *Birth of the Leviathan,* 317-324.

codification of informal into formal, and formalization of rules took place after industrialization and urbanization.[62] The aspect that interests us is how in the light of the European example is it possible to resist patrimonial or rent seeking distortion of state structures during the state making process. Patrimonial political structures in the context of Europe converted into efficient non-patrimonial ones through a relatively longer process of the monarch's dependence on domestic resource generation. The monarch's success in extracting domestic resources for centralizing the coercive capacity of the state depended on his abilities to provide justice to his people and concede some form of control over the public purse to their representatives. And as Ertman notes, autonomous, participatory and strong local government bodies in England and some other European states played a crucial role in keeping the absolutist, patrimonial and patronage based practices of the monarchs in check.[63] Both underline the significance of state development financed by indigenous capital extraction and the importance of independent local self governing bodies for a healthy and legitimate state building process.

An additional lesson is that the European state making experience was rarely peaceful. External wars and internal subjugation of the local contenders of power by the monarch made this process very violent. It helps us to understand why state formation in non-European societies assumes a violent tone. Given the international recognition of the new states' external boundaries, the struggles and wars are overwhelmingly internal, waged against dissident groups and regions. These internal wars have largely weakened state capacity and eroded its legitimacy in post colonial societies.

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[62] Informal relations based on "patronage, corruption and incestuous relations between big and small business were widespread in the US as well as Europe". See Nils Boesen, "Governance and Accountability: How do the Formal and the Informal Interplay and Change", (International Seminar on Informal Institutions and Development-What do we know and what can we do?, Input Paper for Session B: Governance, Accountability and Capacity Development, 11-12 December 2006), accessed on January 12, 2012, at http://www.oecd.org/dac/governance-development/37680055.pdf.

[63] As Ertman suggests, an overriding lesson for today's state builders is that right from the start it is the combination of a strong centre and strong, participatory localities which, over the long run, will best permit states to balance the demands of infrastructure expansion, political participation, economic growth, and geo-political competition. See Ertman, *Birth of the Leviathan,* 317-324.

The extension of Western statehood to non-Western societies without the development of relevant socio-political and economic structures that stabilized Western polities in their evolutionary phase has resulted in the formation of states that are weak and vulnerable. Faced with myriads of problems, the most difficult of which is the extension of state authority to the inhospitable periphery with low population density and subsistence economy, the developing country elites have failed in their attempts to establish a monopoly over violence. The failure to provide security and other essential state services in these peripheries, has resulted in the strengthening of the traditional community governance actors and structures, such as the extended family, village elders, tribes, and religious institutions to run the socio-political order and even the dispensation of justice. Another facet of political life common to conflict-ridden societies, such as, Afghanistan and Somalia is the rise of strongmen or warlords as masters of violence and conversely maintainers of order. Such warlords emerge when protracted conflict or civil wars weaken not only state structures but also traditional informal governance institutions. In such settings, the state is not the lone provider of security and services but has to share its authority, legitimacy and capacity with other non state informal structures[64].

To sum-up, post colonial African and Asian countries classify poorly as states when measured against the classical, Eurocentric Weberian definition of the state having a monopoly of force over its territory and population. To borrow from Jackson and Rosberg the attributes of statehood in the form of a stable population and effective government are seriously contested and challenged in these countries[65]. The post 1945 international system was based on the premise that the new states were

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[64] Boege et al., call these hybrid political orders, where diverse and competing claims to power and logic coexist and overlap, namely the logic of the formal state, of traditional informal societal order and of globalization and associated social fragmentation (ethnic, tribal and religious). See Volker Boege, Anna Brown, Kevin Clements and Anna Nolan, "On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States: What is Failing-States in the Global South or Research and Politics in the West?", in Martina Fischer and Beatrix Schmelzle (eds.), *Building Peace in the Absence of States: Challenging the Discourse on State Failure* (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2009), 15-31.

[65] See Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood," *World Politics* 35, issue 1 (October 1982): 1-24; and Robert H. Jackson, "Quasi-States, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: International Jurisprudence and the Third World," *International Organization* 41, no.4 (Autumn 1987): 525-530.

capable of functioning as viable units with monopoly over violence and provision of security and services to their citizens. However, the post 1945 international system also placed the obligation on the new states to develop on lines of the Weberian ideals of a strong, centralized, democratic and well-governed state. That the new states were not measuring up to these ideals was somewhat masked during the Cold War by the provision of strategic aid and defense capabilities to the weaker members of the international system. Super power support coupled with international recognition of a state's external boundaries provided superficial and temporary stability to these states and relieved the office holders from pressures to enhance domestic control and authority. The support was cut abruptly with the end of the Cold War. As a result, the regulatory capacity of the state was further weakened, making the prospects of armed resistance against the centre attractive for many predatory groups. The end of the Cold War witnessed a sharp rise in the number of civil wars in non-Western societies. Weak state capacity, low institutional competence, violence and war have resulted in the emergence of the phenomenon of 'failed states' in the international state system.

Conclusions

This paper argued that the European state making experience was facilitated by the contradictions of medieval politics, especially the contested nature of the sovereign's power. Coercion assumed the characteristics of developments in military technology that made wars decisive and underlined the significance of standing armies. Coercion as a tool of state making was very violent; wars necessitated forced conscriptions and payment of taxes to support military growth. Its ultimate effect was the establishment of the state's monopoly over violence within the territorial unit claimed by a sovereign monarch. The paper also contends that the role of capital was central in building standing armies and constructing bureaucratic administrations. It also argues that in Europe, state building preceded legitimacy building. Popular democratic legitimacy came at a much later stage, once centralization and coercive control over territory and population had already taken place. The findings of the paper further suggest that unlike Europe, the state in non-Western societies grew out of the collapse of colonialism. The territories of these states were not delimited by wars, but were inherited as a given fact from their erstwhile colonial masters. The growth of coercion followed a path distinct from the European states and the state's monopoly over violence

was never absolute especially in the periphery, owing to manifold problems that were a product of centuries of colonial rule.

Tracing the history of European state formation facilitates an understanding of the constraints under which alternate state formation took place and how these constraints have created a crisis of legitimacy and governance for the elites of developing countries. It demonstrates that state making is a long term, non-linear, and difficult process. The criticism directed at the developing world elite for their failure in building strong states, does not take into consideration the fact that state building cannot be time bound in the face of complexities arising from new constraints and compulsions. Globalization and its concomitant adverse effects on the state's cohesion and strength were absent when states were forming in early modern Europe. Another lesson gleaned is that stability and order require the construction of state structures around efficient and patronage free practices, and the creation of apolitical bureaucratic structures is a *sin qua non* for creating a service oriented state. European state making had a fair share of inefficient and patrimonial regimes that proved extremely durable and hard to dislodge. The evolution of non-patrimonial political structures was slow, owing to the monarchy's successful extraction of domestic resources and its ability to provide justice to the people. Added to it was the concession of control over the public purse to the peoples' representatives. The role of autonomous, participatory and strong local government bodies in England and other European states was crucial in keeping the absolutist and patronage based practices of the monarchs in check. This signifies the crucial role of indigenous capital extraction and participatory local bodies, for a robust process of state building.