# THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY AND THE PROSPECTS FOR TURKEY'S INCLUSION IN THE EU

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The peace and security of the European continent has been the top priority of the European Community / European Union's leadership since the formation of the Community. In order to ensure security and peaceful coexistence, the EU has been encouraging regional cooperation, the promotion of human rights, democracy, and good governance in countries located close to the European continent. The EU has therefore, been continuously trying to prevent the outbreak of conflicts in its neighbourhood. It has also been making efforts to check the prevalence of international crimes in its immediate neighbourhood.[1]

The EU has been formulating new policies since the mid-1990s with the objective of engaging neighbouring countries in the southern Mediterranean region to achieve peace, security and stability in the wider region.[2]

In 1995, the EU initiated a partnership programme called the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), also known as the Barcelona Process, with its southern Mediterranean neighbours. The process was aimed at creating a platform which would facilitate the EU's dialogue with the countries of the southern Mediterranean for achieving institutionalized cooperation, peace, and stability in the wider region. Another objective was to strengthen political and economic relations of the EU with the regional countries.[3] The EMP provided numerous incentives to the non-

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[1] Sandra Lavenex, "A Governance Perspective on the European Neighborhood Policy: Integration Beyond Conditionality", *Journal of European Public Policy* 15, Issue 6 (2008). See http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13501760802196879 (accessed September 27, 2015).

[2] Cigdem Ustun, "EU and Turkish Neighborhood Policies: Common Goals", *Caucasian Review of International Affairs* 4, no.4 (Autumn 2010): 342-353. Available from http://www.cria-online.org/13_3.html (accessed on May 24, 2015).

[3] Stephen C. Calleya, "Is the Barcelona Process Working? EU Policy in the Mediterranean", *ZEI Discussion Paper*, No. 75 (2000): 8. http://www.cria-online.org/13_3.html (accessed May 24,2015).

European partner countries; however, it did not offer EU membership to them.[4]

The EMP however, failed to achieve most of the objectives set by the EU and therefore, after prolonged and careful thinking, the concerned EU institutions decided to present another policy called the "European Neighbourhood Policy" (ENP), which was implemented in 2004. This policy was aimed at reducing external threats to the security of Europe and enhancing the Union's ability to encourage and promote the adoption of European Union norms by its neighbours. The main objective of the policy as outlined in the original document was "promoting the regional and sub regional cooperation and integration which are considered as preconditions for political stability, economic development and the reduction of poverty and social divisions".[5] This was yet another EU initiative to strengthen the security of the European continent by the induction of new partners in its neighbourhood programme.[6] The ENP clearly reflects the EU's wish to create a "ring of friends" around its boundaries in order to expand its political and economic influence.[7] The policy also aims at curtailing further enlargement towards Eastern Europe.

However, it appears that the policy offers very little to the EU's neighbours, while it demands quite a lot from them.[8] Nevertheless, the EU wants to ensure that it has very good relations with all its immediate neighbours and with this aim in view it is guided by the Treaty of Westphalia signed in 1648

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[4] Romano Prodi, 'A Wider Europe - A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability', Sixth ECSA-World Conference, Jean Monnet Project, Brussels, December 5-6, 2002. Visit at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/02/619&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (accessed on September 29, 2014).

[5] Ibid, 342.

[6] Aliboni Roberto," The Geopolitical Implications of the European Neighborhood Policy", *European Foreign Affairs Review* 10, no.1 (2005): 29, Available from http://www.palgrave-journals.com/cep/journal/v9/n4/full/cep20119a.html (accessed November 02, 2014).

[7] Karen E. Smith, "The Outsiders: The European Neighborhood Policy", *International Affairs* 81, Issue 4 (July 2005): 757-773. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2005.00483.x/abstract;jsessionid (accessed November 02, 2014).

[8] Kelley Judith," New Wine in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through the New European Neighborhood Policy*", Journal of Common Market Studies* 44, Issue 1 (March 2005): 29-55, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j (accessed November 03, 2014).

that provides the most comprehensive and long lasting guidelines for good neighbourly relations amongst the various European countries.[9]

The 2004 Strategy Paper on EU Neighbourhood Policy clearly delineates the vision of the policy as forming "a ring of countries, sharing the EU's fundamental values and objectives, drawn into an increasingly close relationship". The new strategy goes beyond mere cooperation and aims at introducing "a significant measure of economic and political integration" with its neighbouring countries.[10] However, this offer of political and economic integration puts a strong onus on its neighbours to conform to the norms of the EU if they are to draw the benefits which the policy offers in return.

It may be noted that both the EMP and ENP were formulated to meet the security needs of the EU, which is keen to ensure the stability and prosperity of the EU area. However, both these policies do not offer any prospects of membership to participants. The EU goals in launching the EMP and the ENP have been rightly described as "milieu goals" by Arnold Wolfers. These are matter of fact policies that are aimed at shaping the EU's external environment in its neighbourhood by establishing shared norms that would ensure cooperative international relations as well as peace, stability and prosperity for all the parties concerned.[11]

The EU is deeply concerned about implementation of the "European Security Strategy". This strategy calls for promoting and safeguarding good governance, democracy and the rule of law in countries bordering the EU. The EU is also very anxious about ensuring the physical security of Europe and wants to be certain that no country in close proximity to the EU poses a military threat to the region. This is an important reason for replacing the earlier European initiative of a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) by a European Neighbourhood Policy, for it envisages more intense bilateral and

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[9] Johannes Varwick & Kai Olaf, *European Neighborhood Policy: Challenges for the EU Policy Towards the New Neighbors* (USA: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2007), 39-40.

[10] "European Neighborhood Policy Strategy Paper", Brussels, December 12, 2004, p-5. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf (accessed September 29, 2014).

[11] Michele Comelli, Atila Eralp, & Cigdem Ustun (eds.), *The European Neighborhood Policy and the Southern Mediterranean* (Ankara: Middle East Technical University Press, 2009), 17.

multilateral regional cooperation in the fields of security and politics, economy, society and culture.[12]

The ENP focuses on the achievement of "milieu goals", which broadly means security in all its aspects. The Regional Director for RELEX, Eberhard Rhein, in 1990, defined the factors affecting EU security from the southern Mediterranean region, as follows:

- War with each other;
- Destabilization by socio-political conflicts;
- Export of terrorism or drugs to Europe;
- Threat to Europe's social stability by continued or sharply increased flow of illegal immigrants.[13]

In order to create an area of peace, prosperity and stability in Europe and its neighborhood, the EU under its ENP has entered into bilateral trade agreements with neighbouring states.[14] These trade agreements with the EU's southern neighbours are aimed at establishing an effective Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area in which all kinds of barriers to trade and investment between the EU and the southern Mediterranean countries and among the southern Mediterranean countries are removed. The removal of trade barriers in the wider region is likely to be very beneficial to all.  The EU has so far successfully concluded Free Trade Agreements with most of its southern neighbours.[15]

It may appear a trite statement, but conflicts and rivalries between neighbouring states always have an adverse impact on their bilateral relations, and create an atmosphere of general mistrust and insecurity. It is therefore, very difficult to ensure that the conflicts and rivalries that already exist in the EU's southern neighbourhood do not have any adverse

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[12] Raffaella A. Del Sarto & Tobias Schumacher, "From EMP to ENP: What's at Stake with the European Neighborhood Policy Towards the Southern Mediterranean?", *European Foreign Affairs Review* 10 (2005): 17-38. http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/abstract.php?id=EERR2005002&PHPSESSID  (accessed May 23, 2015).

[13] E. Rhein, "Europe and the Mediterranean. A Newly Emerging Geopolitical Area?", *European Foreign Affairs Review* 1, no. 1 (July 1996): 79-86.

[14] Ibid, 38.

[15] Countries and Regions: Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, European Commission. http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/euro-mediterranean-partnership/ (accessed March 22, 2015).

effects on the security and well being of the countries of the European Union. Likewise, criminal activities like drug trafficking, gun running, human trafficking etc. which are common in the southern Mediterranean countries can have very serious consequences for European security. The EU is therefore, very earnest about tackling these issues, which is why it is trying through its neighborhood policy to promote democracy, the rule of law, good governance and better human rights in countries bordering Europe. Promoting these values will be of great help in controlling crime. The adoption of the European norms are also important for the promotion of relations between the EU member states and their southern neighbours.[16] The EU therefore, makes constant efforts to persuade the governments and the civil societies in these countries to adopt these norms to tidy up their Augean stables.

The results of a panel study (carried out between 1988-2004) of the countries of the European Union and its neighbourhood in the Eastern and Central Europe disclosed a positive impact of the urgings of the EU. The offer of European Union membership to the Eastern and Central European countries on the condition that they reformed their political and economic system to conform to that of the Western system, had a positive impact upon the political environment in those countries.[17]

In the case of the southern Mediterranean countries, there is no such incentive. Also, owing to the acute economic and political problems of the countries to the south of Europe, the policy is failing to produce the desired results and no significant signs of improvement are emerging. On-going conflict in Libya and Syria, continuing political instability in Iraq, and the lingering conflict between Israel and the Palestinians are just a few reasons why, the ENP is not proving efficacious. The march of the so called Islamic State and the resulting military intervention in Syria has triggered the influx of Syrian refugees to the European countries. This situation threatens to upset the political, economic and social setup of these European countries. Therefore, there is the need now to re-evaluate the EU's policy in the region so as to make it more realistic and responsive to the new ground

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[16] Frank. Schimmelfenning, European *Neighborhood Policy: Political Conditionality and its Impact on Democracy in Non-Candidate Neighboring Countries* (Austin, Texas: 2005), 187-215.

[17] Ibid.

realities. The EU also has to improve upon the tools being employed to achieve its goals.[18]

**Turkey and the ENP**
As already pointed out, the European Neighbourhood Policy does not hold out to the partner countries any prospect of EU membership. Therefore, Turkey, which is already a candidate country for EU membership, has not been allowed to take part in the ENP. Russia too, which is one of the main littoral states of the Black Sea and has historically shaped Black Sea politics along with Turkey, has not been invited to become a partner in the ENP. Therefore, both Turkey and Russia have decided to advance their respective strategic roles in the region. Nevertheless, both these countries still want to be part of the ENP so as to enable them to influence EU policy towards the region. Russia and Turkey place emphasis on their special position in the region[19].

While Turkey is an active member of NATO and shares borders with the EU, it has disagreements with the latter over specific policies towards the countries of the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus. It has been pointed out that the EU candidacy status of Turkey is a determining element in the formulation of Turkish foreign policy.[20] Whereas, Turkey, owing to its cultural, political, economic, and commercial ties with the countries of the southern Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus fully qualifies as a member of the ENP, where it could play an important role, the ENP constraints do not allow it to be part of the grouping.

Since the 1990's, Turkey has instituted far reaching changes in its foreign policy. It is noteworthy that Turkey is now looking for a more active and participative role in the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans, and apparently the main aim is to advance its EU candidacy status. For this purpose it has brought its policies in its immediate neighbourhood in line

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[18] Stefan Lehne,"Time to Reset European Neighborhood Policy", *Carnegie Europe* (February 04, 2014). http://carnegieeurope.eu/2014/02/04/time-to-reset-european-neighborhood-policy (accessed September 05, 2014).

[19] Ustin Cigdem, EU and Turkish Neighbourhood Policies: Common Goals, *Caucasian Review of International Relations* 4, no.4 (Autumn 2010). http://www.cria-online.org/13_3.html (accessed May 24, 2015)

[20] Ibid.

with the policies of the EU, and is thus indirectly supporting the EU efforts in materializing its ENP objectives.

The EU since the mid 1990's has been making efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and contribute to the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) as a member of the Middle East Quartet (the US, the EU, Russia and the UN). It is in the EU's own interest to promote peace, stability and cooperation in its neighbourhood, particularly in the Mediterranean region, which is strategically important because North Africa and the Middle East are important suppliers of oil and gas[21]. Europe is dependent on energy supplies from the region. Conditions in this region directly affect Turkey's territorial integrity.[*] It is very important that peace and stability is restored in Iraq and Syria, Turkey's immediate neighbours. The continuing civil war in Syria and the Kurdish separatist movement have made Turkey vulnerable to bomb attacks. Thus Turkey's internal security has been seriously threatened, forcing it to deploy large numbers of Turkish ground and air forces on its Syrian as well as Iraqi borders.

In the current scenario, Turkey has been making efforts to influence the EU's approach and policies towards the region, as these directly affects its strategic interests in the Middle East and also its security.

It has been observed that despite Turkey's best efforts in complying with the EU's requirements by modifying its internal and external policies to align them with those of the Union, in order to improve its chances of gaining membership, the European Union on its part has been delaying and disrupting the process. The EU has been issuing conflicting statements on EU membership for Turkey and is offering alternative schemes to keep the country out. Some major member states of the EU in particular, have been continuously opposing Turkey's membership of the EU on various grounds, and instead propose association schemes much short of full membership of the EU.

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[21] William Wallace, "Looking After the Neighborhood: Responsibilities for the EU-25", *Notre Europe Policy Paper*, No. 4 (July 2003), 19. http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/SinemAkgulAcikmese.pdf.

[*] Turkey shares borders with eight countries: Syria and Iraq to the South; Iran, Armenia and Nakhchivan, an enclave of Azerbaijan to the east; Georgia to the northeast; Bulgaria to the northwest and Greece to the West. It is a littoral state of the Mediterranean Sea (south), the Black Sea (north) and the Aegean Sea (west).

French President Nicolas Sarkozy suggested a new scheme the 'Mediterranean Union' at the Paris summit of EU leaders in 2007. Turkey was offered membership of this Union, instead of EU membership. This new scheme was in a way a continuation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) first introduced in 1995.

The 'Mediterranean Union' presented a framework for political, economic and cultural relations between the European Union and the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries and its avowed aim was to create an area of peace, stability, security and shared economic prosperity in the broader region. It called for ensuring respect for democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms and promotion of understanding between cultures and civilizations in the Euro-Mediterranean region.[22]

This scheme presented by Sarkozy was severely criticized by Turkey, which did not like the idea of an alternative to EU membership. This proposed plan was also criticized by other Mediterranean states as it risked reducing the effectiveness of the already established neighbourhood policies in the Mediterranean region. At the same time, the civil society organizations in the EU member states and the southern Mediterranean countries which have been involved in the Mediterranean policies of the EU for over a decade, also drew attention to the possibility of duplication of policies and initiatives under the Barcelona Process.[23]

The Mediterranean Union proposal has since then undergone modifications and has been launched as the 'Union for the Mediterranean'. Despite its initial opposition to the new scheme, Turkey has actively participated in the activities of this Union and has improved its relations with the Mediterranean and the Middle Eastern countries. Turkey acknowledges the importance of the Union for the Mediterranean and considers it as an asset in the development of the ENP and the creation of a 'ring of friends' in the region.

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[22] Union for the Mediterranean, News Letter. Visit at http://ufmsecretariat.org/#. (accessed June 14, 2015).

[23]  Roberto Aliboni et al., "Putting the Mediterranean Union in Perspective", *EuroMesco Paper,* No. 68, June 2008. http://www.euromesco.net/images/paper68eng.pdf (accessed January 24, 2015).

It has been observed that since the last two decades, Turkey's foreign policy has tilted towards the Middle East. It has begun to show sympathy for the Palestinian cause and has also become proactive with regard to other regional disputes. Diplomatic clashes at various forums have been observed in the political arena with Israel, the main pro-US player in the region. However, it has also been observed that despite disputes and disagreements at the political and diplomatic level, the economic and trade relations as well as the military and security relations between Turkey and Israel have remained largely unaffected. In 2014, bilateral trade between Israel and Turkey was worth $5.44 billion and Turkey is listed as one of the main trading partners of Israel both in imports and exports.[24]

Turkey's relations with other Middle Eastern countries, particularly the oil rich Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have improved tremendously and it now enjoys their full confidence. In 2008, Turkey succeeded in establishing a "High Level Strategic Dialogue Mechanism" with these countries which has become a driving force for the strengthening of relations between Turkey and the GCC. The trade volume of Turkey with the GCC has shown a surge and it amounted to around 16 billion USD in 2014. One can say with confidence that Turkey is following a win-win strategy with the GCC countries.[25]

Since the year 2000, Turkey has been increasingly using its soft power to help in resolving various political issues in the Arab and the Islamic worlds. It has been advocating the necessity of political and economic reforms, and the promotion of harmony between the different cultures and civilizations in this region. Turkey's strategy of aligning its policies with those of the EU in the Mediterranean and the Middle East shows that it wants the EU to believe that Turkey is an important and effective political player in the region, with deep rooted relations with the regional countries. Turkey has also displayed its resolve to pursue a peaceful and just resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and has taken some steps to promote the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq. Ankara has also played a positive role in finding a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis. The

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[24] DG Trade, *Israel – EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World*, at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113402.pdf (accessed September 29, 2014).

[25] Andrew Jay Rosenbaum, "Turkey and the GCC: A 'Win-Win Dynamics", *Middle East Monitor*, at https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/blogs/politics/20410-turkey-and-the-gcc-a-win-win-dynamic (accessed February 28, 2016).

policies pursued by the government of Tayyab Erdogan for the past one decade clearly demonstrate Turkey's desire to fully support and complement the EU's regional policies while carving out a niche for a Turkish role in the region.

In the current Syrian refugee crisis, Turkey has helped out the Union by accepting a large number of Syrian refugees in Turkey. Besides, much to the annoyance of Russia, it has been opposing the Bashar al Asad regime in Syria and is giving political and material support to the forces that have rebelled against the regime in Damascus.

**The Black Sea and the Caucasus**
Turkey has been equally active in the Black Sea and the Caucasus regions since the disintegration of the Soviet empire. Its main aim has been to carve out an area of influence for itself in this region. Historically, it had very strong cultural, ethnic, and religious ties with the countries of the region, such as Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.[26] Turkey has worked hard to position itself in the centre of regional cooperation in the Black Sea region, connecting the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Balkans and Europe.[27] Turkey is interested in increasing its influence in the region and beyond and also wants to lead the regional countries in establishing effective trade and political relations with the EU.[28] The EU has been convinced by Ankara that Turkey provides a feasible alternative route for Central Asian oil and gas exports to Europe, which would decrease Europe's dependence on the Russian and Middle Eastern oil supplies.

In the Black Sea region, the EU's attention has been mainly focused on gas and oil projects, electricity networks, the Black Sea Ring Corridor, the Black

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[26] Necdet Pamir, "Energy and Pipeline Security in The Black Sea and Caspian Sea Regions: Challenges and Solutions", in Oleaksandr Pavliuk and Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze (eds.), *The Black Sea Region Cooperation and Security Building* (NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2004), 142.

[27] Çiğdem Üstün, "Turkish Perception on the Black Sea Region: A Historical Analysis", *Valahian Journal of Historical Studies* 9 (2008): 67-83.

[28] Bülent Gokay, "The Politics of Oil in the Back Sea Area: Turkey and Regional Power Rivalries", in Tunç Aybak (ed.), *Politics of the Black Sea Dynamics of Cooperation and Conflict* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001), 18.

Sea Pan European Transport Area,[29] the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA)[30], linking Central Asia and the Caucasus, and projects on environmental protection. Turkey is primarily interested in TRACECA and became part of the programme in 2002. Ankara places special emphasis on this programme with a view to increasing its role in regional transport while decreasing the pressure of traffic at the Bosporus and Dardanelles.

The EU's main concerns in the region can be listed as energy security, environmental issues, frozen conflicts, and cooperative measures to combat new security threats, including threats to human security.

As a country negotiating its accession to the European Union, Turkey shares the EU's policy goals and values. Turkey is a close partner of the EU and an important regional player and it is believed that Turkey and the EU can develop important synergies through their interactions with the neighbourhood they have in common, which could prove beneficial for both Turkey and the EU.

In 2010-2011, the EU carried out a review of the ENP. This review was pertinent because there were important changes in the southern Mediterranean region during that period, which required a new policy response.

The new EU approach is based on the principle of "more for more". It offers more EU support in return for more reforms and democratization in partner countries. EU action is now more focused on support for reforms in key areas in its partner countries.

This is reflected in the ENP which is based on mutual accountability and conditionality. If a partner country wishes to obtain greater support from the EU, participate in the EU internal market, and ensure greater mobility in the EU for its citizens, it will have to demonstrate clear commitment to a number of significant political reforms. Conversely, the EU will be

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[29]  It promotes a new link between East and West by facilitating the overland transport of goods from Europe to Asia and vice versa. http://www.mt.gov.tr/eubak/projects/international (accessed August 15,2015).

[30] TRACECA program is an EU funded (partly) project on construction of a transport corridor between Europe, Caucasus and Asia.

accountable to its partners for delivering on its offers of support for political and economic reform. This includes not only financial support, but also improved and better-managed mobility of people and trade integration. Ultimately, the EU hopes to conclude with each partner 'Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas', which will allow partner countries' integration into the single market of the European Union.[31]

### The Syrian refugee crisis and its impact on the EU Neighborhood Policy

The continuing civil war in Syria and the instability in Iraq have adversely affected the EU's Neighbourhood Policy, as hundreds of thousands of refugees are pouring into Europe and its southern Mediterranean neighbours. This has caused the world's biggest refugees crisis since the end of the Second World War. The EU is trying to develop consensus among its member states on the issue of the refugees, but there are serious reservations in some member states on the acceptance of refugees. However, the EU has succeeded in creating a Trust Fund with an initial capital of 350 million Euros for helping out the refugees in Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan.[32]

### The European Neighborhood Policy and its impact on Turkey

Turkey is a close partner of the EU and in recent years has become an important regional player; it shares the EU's policy goals and principles. It is believed that Turkey and the EU can benefit from their interactions with the neighbourhood they have in common by adopting policies that are complementary.

Turkey's foreign policy principle of "zero problems with neighbours" can basically be described as a regional vision based on a common security outlook, high-level political dialogue and deeper economic and cultural cooperation. This policy is in line with the EU's European Neighborhood Policy. Turkey's foreign policy aims to ensure stability, prosperity and security for all its neighbouring regions.

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[31] Stefan Fule, Turkey and the European Neighborhood Policy, Vol.10, No.2. *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 17-18. http://turkishpolicy.com/pdf/vol_10-no_2-fule.pdf. (accessed May, 31, 2015).

[32] Syrian Refugee Crisis: EU Trust Fund launches single biggest EU response package over 350 million Euros. See *European Commission* at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/news_corner/news/2015/12/20151201_en.htm (accessed February 29, 2016).

Essentially, stability in Turkey's neighbourhood would ensure the unhindered supply of energy resources from the Middle East, Iran, and Central Asia to Europe. It is keen to act as a transit country for the new Southern Energy Corridor of the EU. The EU needs a steady supply of gas from its eastern neighbours to meet its current and future demands of energy and Turkey is one country on which it can rely.

The EU's dependence on Turkey and vice versa would continue not only in the context of security against any future Russian territorial designs, but also because of Turkey's role as a counterweight against any Russian efforts to monopolize the energy supply market. The EU also needs Turkey's cooperation in ensuring political stability in its neighbourhood which can only be done with the country's active involvement. The future course of events in the Euro-Mediterranean region together with Turkey's domestic political developments will determine whether or not Turkey will be granted membership of the European Union.